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COMES NOW the Appellant, Patrick Glen Hamilton, and through his attorney ofrecord, 




THE SOPS ARE VOID AND TIIEREFORE THE BREA TH TEST 
RESULTS CANNOT BE USED TO SUPPORT A LICENSE SUSPENSION 
The State in its Respondenf s Brief states: "The Administrative Procedures Act permits the 
Idaho State Police to adopt a temporary rule effective upon its publication in the Idaho 
Administrative Bulletin, I.C. § 67-5226. The Governor's finding clearly justifies ISP's temporary 
rulemaking." Respondent's Brief at p. 16. Mr. Litteneker attached to his Respondent's Brief a copy 
of the section Idaho Administrative Bulletin that sets out the temporary rule. That Administrative 
Bulletin is dated October 1, 2014. Based on the State's argument, the ID APA rules regarding breath 
testing would have been effective on October 1, 2014, not on September 7, 2014. 
Idaho Code§ 67-5226(1) states: "(l) If the governor finds that: (a) Protection ofthe public 
health, safety, or welfare; ... ". There is nothing in this record that indicates that the Governor made 
any findings that justifies ISP' s temporary rulemaking. The language from the legislature is quite 
clear that the Governor has to make a finding that the temporary rulemaking is justified. Based on 
Mr. Litteneker's argument, the temporary rule would not have been effective until October 1, 2014, 
,vhich doesn't justify the finding made by the hearing officer in Mr. Hamilton's case. The State, in 
its briefing, does not cite to the hearing officer's specific finding. The hearing officer noted: 
"4. \VAS THE EVIDENTIARY TEST PERFORMED IN COMPLIANCE 
WITH ALL REQUIREMENTS SET FORTH IN IDAHO CODE AND ISPFS 
SOP? 1. Senior Trooper Talbott's sworn statement states the evidentiary test was 
performed in compliance with Idaho Code andISPFS SOP. 2. Hamilton's evidentiary 
test was performed in compliance with Idaho Code and ISPFS SOP. 
Findings and Conclusions, p. 6, Exhibit to Clerk's Record, p. 363 
The hearing officer goes on to note: 
5. DID THE EVIDENTIARY TESTING INSTRUMENT FUNCTION 
PROPERLY WHEN THE TEST \VAS ADMINISTERED? ... 2. The valid 
performanee verifieation check approved the instrument for evidentiary testing in 
accordance with ISPFS SOP. 
Findings and Conclusions, p. 6, Exhibit to Clerk's Record, p. 363 
The arresting officer's declaration states as follows: 
"Defendant \Vas tested for alcohol concentration, drugs, or other intoxicating 
substances. The test(s) was/were performed in compliance with Section 18-8003 & 
18-8004( 4 ), Idaho Code, and the standards and methods adopted by the Department 
of Law Enforcement." 
Exhibit to Clerk's Record, p. 6 
The Department of Lmv Enforcement did not exist in September 2014. The Trooper cited 
to standards and methods that haven't been in existence for several years. There may be an argument 
that the Department of Law Enforcement is now ISP Forensic Services but why doesn't the 
Declaration cite to ISP Forensic Services. The Declaration is specific to the standards and methods 
adopted by the Department of Law Enforcement. The hearing officer was very specific in his 
findings that he used ISP Forensic Services' SOP; not administrative rules. In Hern v. State c~l 
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Court Appeals, Docket Opinion 87 (Ct. 
App. 2015) and Ewing v. State of Idaho, Department of Transportation, Docket No. 42599, 
Unpublished Opinion No. 777 (Ct. App. 2015), the Court of Appeals determined the SOPs were 
void. Clearly, rulemaking did not take effect until after Mr. Hamilton's breath test, therefore, the 
application of Hern and Ewing, to Mr. Hamilton's case is appropriate. See also State v. Haynes, 159 
Idaho 36,355 P.3d 1266 (2015), State v. Riendeau, 159 Idaho 52,355 P.3d 1282 (2015), State v. 
l'{auert, Kootenai County Case No. CR 2013-10176, Supreme Court. No. 0042441-2014 (dismissed 
upon motion of the State). Mr. Hamilton's initial briefing vvas submitted to the Court prior to the 
decisions issued by the Court of Appeals in Hern and Ewing. 
The hearing officer, in Mr. Hamilton's case, did comment on the argument regarding IDAP A 
rulemaking and simply noted that: "On September 2014, ISP Forensic Services adopted the SOP 
into the IDAPA rules:' The hearing officer then cites to websites. ISP Forensic Services did not 
"adopt the SOP" into the administrative rules. The SOP is void. Based on the Attorney General's 
statement in his brief~ the ID APA rules did not become effective until October L 2014. However, 
there is no evidence in this record of compliance with I.C. § 67-5226(1 ). The Governor did not 
making a finding. 
As this Court is avvare, the arresting trooper avoided being subpoenaed so he could not be 
questioned regarding his outdated Declaration and his knowledge of any nevvly drafted ID APA rules. 
Common sense vvould probably dictate that Trooper Talbott would not have had any knovvledge of 
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IDAPA breath testing the State Idaho nothing was published 
October 1, 2014. 
At no time, during the hearing on October 1, 2014, did hearing officer Eric Moody, note for 
the record that he ,vas considering any IDAPA Rules regarding breath testing. He does say that he 
is going to take judicial notice of the Idaho Administrative Procedures Act, the Idaho State Police 
Forensic Website, relevant city or county ordinances, Idaho statutes, Court decisions and the 
National Highway Traffic Safety Administration Manual for field sobriety testing. Counsel had 
previously filed an objection to judicial type notice. Exhibit to Clerk's Record, p. 39, Tr., pp. 7-8. 
The District Court in Mr. tiamilton's case used his decision regarding the SOPs from Hern 
v. ITD to justify his Hamilton decision. As this Court is aware, Judge Brudie's decision in Hern v. 
JTD was overturned on December 30, 2015. The District Court's analysis was wrong on the issue 
of the SOPs. The SOPs are void and not a basis for breath testing. The hearing officer used the 
SOPs for his finding proper breath testing. 
Mr. Hamilton has met his burden, as did Mr. Hem and Mr. Ewing, regarding the argument 
of the SOPs. The State noted: "Mr. Hamilton offers nothing more than the same unsubstantiated 
argument consistently rejected by the Court." Respondent's Brief, p. 17. This is the same sort of 
argument the State made \vith regard to Mr. Ewing and Mr. Hem's cases. The argument regarding 
the SOPs ,vas "substantiated" in Hern and Ewing and Mr. Hamilton has met his burden pursuant to 
I.C. § l 8-8002A(7)(d). Therefore, the Court must determination that the breath test does not support 
the license suspension. 
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B. 
THERE WAS NO LEGAL CAUSE TO STOP MR. HAMILTON'S 
MOTOR VEHICLE PURSUANT TO I.C. § 18-8002A(7)(a) 
The State's Brief fails to take into account the fact that J.C.§ 49-456(1) must be construed 
\Vith the rest of the provisions in the chapter dealing with registration. "Language of a particular 
section need not be vie\ved in a vacuum. And all sections of applicable statutes must be construed 
together so as to determine the legislature's intent." Lockhart v. Dep 't of Fish and Game, 121 Idaho 
894,897,828 P.2d 1299, 1302 (1992)". State v. Neal, 159 Idaho 439,362 P.3d 514 (2015). The 
District Judge in Hamilton did not discuss or construe I.C. § 49-456(1 ). The State simply says the 
statute doesn't apply but doesn't explain why LC.§ 49-456(1) doesn't apply. Again, let's be clear, 
Mr. Hamilton did not have an improper registration sticker as was determined by the hearing officer. 
The hearing officer said: "J.C. § 49-428(2) clearly notes a vehicle is not properly registered if the 
registration sticker is not located on the license plate as set forth in I.C. § 49-443(4)." I.C. §49-
428(2) does not "clearly"' note that a vehicle is "not properly registered" if the registration sticker is 
outside the rectangle box. This finding is not the reason Mr. IIamilton was pulled over. Mr. 
Hamilton vvas pulled over because the registration sticker was not in the rectangle box. The hearing 
officer's decision is based on an improper registration or improper registration sticker, which is not 
found on this record. The only thing that is found on this record is the fact that the registration 
sticker was not in the rectangle box. Findings and Conclusion, pp. 4-5, Exhibit to Clerk's Record, 
pp. 361-362. 
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Idaho Code§ 49-456 and I.LR. 9(b)(1 are applicable to the analysis in this case. Of course 
the State ignores I.LR. 9(b )(16) ·which states: 
Operating vehicle without registration. Section 49-456( 1 ), Idaho Code. (Fixed 
penalty $44.50, court costs $16.50, county justice fund fee $5.00, peace officers 
training fee $15.00, court technology Fund fee $10.00, and emergency surcharge fee 
$10.00). 
There is no Infraction Rule for J.C. § 49-443. The bottom line for the Court is: What is the 
intent or purpose of I.C. § 49-456(1 ); and hmv is the driving public to interpret such a statute? 
C. 
THE APPLICATION OF J.C.§§ 49-428, 49-443 and 49-456 ARE VAGUE 
The State argues: "To be successful, Mr. I Iamilton must demonstrate that LC.§§ 49-428 and 
49-443 are impermissibly vague in all of their applications." Respondent's Brief~ p. 11. The State 
ignores the U.S. Supreme Court Case, Johnson v. United States, 135 S.Ct. 2551, 2560-61, 192 
LEd.2D 569 (2015). Johnson was cited in the first brief filed by Mr. Hamilton but will be noted 
again because the State failed to realize that this U.S. Supreme case trumps Idaho case law. The U.S. 
Supreme noted in Johnson: 
In all events, although statements in some of our opinions could be 
read to suggest otherwise, our holdings squarely contradict the theory 
that a vague provision is constitutional merely because there is some 
conduct that clearly falls within the provision's grasp. For instance, 
we have deemed a law prohibiting grocers from charging an "unjust 
or unreasonable rate" void for vagueness even thought charging 
someone a thousand dollars for a pound of sugar would surely be 
unjust and unreasonable. L. Chen Grocery Co., 255 U.S. at 89, 41 
S.CT. 298. We similarly have deemed void for vagueness a law 
prohibiting people on sidewalks from '·conduct[ing] themselves in a 
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manner annoying to persons passing by" - even though spitting in 
someone's face would surely be annoying. Coates v. Cincinnati, 402 
U.S.611, 91 S.Ct. 1686, 29 L.Ed.2d 214 (1971). These decisions 
refute any suggestions that the existence of some obviously risky 
crimes establishes the residual clause's constitutionality. 
Johnson v. United States, 135 S.Ct. 2551, 2560-61, 192 L.Ed.2D 569 (2015) 
The State, in its brief, goes on to argue as follows: 
"Mr. Hamilton also fails to advise the Court of a recent decision interpreting LC. § 
49-808, ~where the Court of Appeals found that I.C. § 49-808 was not 
unconstitutionally vague as applied, State v. Colvin, 151 Idaho 881, 341 P.3d 589 
(Ct. App. 2014)." 
Respondent's Brief, p. 12 
This argument seems odd considering that Mr. Hamilton, in his initial brief specifically \vent 
head on against the holding in Colvin. See Appellant's Brief: p. 25. The Court \Vould be right to be 
suspect of the State's argument in Mr. Hamilton's case. 
The State also indicates that somehow Mr. Hamilton failed to analyze the effect of State v. 
A1artin, 148 Idaho 31,218 P.3d 10 (Ct. App. 2009). Respondent's Brief, p. 12. Mr. Hamilton's 
Appellant's Brief docs address State v. Afar/in as the Afartin Court failed to apply LC. § 49-456(1) 
in its decision. 
The State also argues that Mr. Hamilton failed to preserve vagueness for judicial review by 
failing to argue vagueness before the hearing otlicer. Mr. Hamilton already addressed this point in 
his opening Appellant's Brief by noting the argument was made to the hearing offieer. The District 
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thought that the issue \Vas properly before it udicial because District 
wrote a decision specifically addressing the issue. R., at p.106. 
The State simply wants to ignore the record in this case regarding vagueness. The hearing 
oflicer commented on LC. § 49-456. The District Court decided to ignore LC. § 49-456 in violation 
of case law that instructs courts to look at all relevant statutes when trying to analyze the intent of 
a statutory scheme. State v. Neal, 159 Idaho 439; 362 P.3d 514 (2015). 
Due process requires that a driver be informed as to what the State commands or forbids and 
that persons of ordinary intelligence not be forced to guess at the meaning of the law. As a result, 
criminal statutes must plainly and unmistakably provide fair notice of what is prohibited and what 
is allO\ved in language persons of ordinary intelligence will understand. In addition, a statute is void 
for vagueness if it invites arbitrary and discriminatory enforcement. See State v. Bitt, 118 ID 584, 
798 P.2d 43 (1990) and State v. Cobb, 132, ID 195, 969 P.2d 244 (1198) In Hamilton, a person of 
ordinary intelligence would believe that I.C. § 49-456(1) applies to what is unlawful \Vith regard to 
registration issues because that is was the statute actually says. What are the standards law 
enforcement is to use to pull someone over when the registration sticker is not in the rectangle box? 
The State ignores this portion of the argument regarding vagueness. 
The photos of the other license plate clearly show the registration sticker not totally in the 
rectangle box. Would law enforcement have the right to pull this vehicle over because the 
registration sticker was not totally in the rectangle box. How is one to know how far in, how far out, 
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straight, crooked the sticker has to No one knows. Judge Schwartzman filed a 
concurring opinion in State v. Dewbre, 133 Idaho 663,991 P.2d. 388 (Ct. App. 2010) in which he 
wrote in a footnote: 
[ 1] My empirical, but thoroughly unscientific, study on this observation was fully 
vindicated on my trip North over Highway 55/95. With the possible exception of 
myself, now fully cognizant of the impending oral argument in this case, I can attest 
that no signals were given by the general travelling public within my line of vision, 
excluding one slow-moving vehicle dutifr1lly moving to the right. Had I.S.P. Officer 
Yount been with me, he could have had afield day handing out tickets for alleged 
49-808 violations. (emphasis original) 
The same can be said for Mr. Hamilton's counsel's observation of the parking lot at the Idaho 
Supreme Court building regarding placement ofregistration stickers on vehicles parked next to the 
Idaho Supreme Court building. One will assume that the vehicles in said parking lot were driven 
and O\Vned by individuals who worked in the Supreme Court Building. 
The Court cannot ignore the application of LC. § 49-456(1) in the determination of the 
vagueness challenge in this case. The Court cannot ignore the issue of how l,nv enforcement might 
determine who they can stop for not having the registration sticker totally in the rectangle that has 
been placed in the lower right hand corner of Idaho license plates. The statutory scheme found in 
Chapter 4 of Title 49 is vague. 
VI. 
CONCLUSION 
ISPFS has failed to follow the statutory mandate of LC. § 18-8002A and § 18-8004(4) 
regarding "rule" making and thus the breath testing for Mr. Hamilton can not be used to suspend his 
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LC.§ 67-5279 mandates a reversal because this action of the agency was unconstitutional, 
as beyond statutory authority and was arbitrary. Additionally, there was no legal cause to stop Mr. 
Hamilton. The three statutes noted above when read together are vague. The Court must set aside 
the hearing officer's decision and send the matter back to the Department vvith instructions to set 
aside the suspension. 
DA TED this 22nd day of February, 2016. 
I hereby certify on the 22nd 
day of February 2016, a two (2) true 
copies of the foregoing instnnnent 
was: XX Mailed 
Faxed 
Hand delivered to: 
Edwin L. Littencker 
Special Deputy Attorney General 
Idaho Transportation Department 
P.O. Box 321 
Lewiston, ID 83501 
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